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Restraints on Alcoholic Beverage Advertising: A
Constitutional Analysis
The role which advertising plays in the consumption and abuse
of alcohol has received considerable attention in recent years.' A
coalition of public health, religious, and educational organizations,
concerned with drunk driving and alcoholism, currently advocates a
congressional ban on the advertising of alcoholic beverages on ra-
dio and television.2 In addition, several states, acting pursuant to
their powers to control alcoholic beverage traffic under the twenty-
first amendment,3 have adopted broad restrictions on liquor adver-
tising.4 Recent changes in the constitutional status of commercial
speech,5 however, indicate that the first amendment 6 may limit gov-
ernment efforts to protect the public from the hazards of alcohol
abuse through the suppression of advertising.
This note addresses the degree to which the first amendment
protects alcohol advertising. Part I examines the development of
the Supreme Court's commercial speech doctrine. Part II analyzes
two recent federal court decisions which upheld the constitutional-
ity of state bans on liquor advertising, and concludes that the courts
improperly applied the constitutional standard for commercial
1 In 1976, concerns about alcohol advertising led Congress to investigate the relation-
ship between the media and alcohol abuse. See Media Images of Alcohol: The Effects of Advertis-
ing and Other Media on Alcohol Abuse, 1976: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Alcoholism and
Narcotics of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as 1976 Hearings]. The Senate Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse also
held hearings on Feb. 7, 1985, in order to discuss possible regulation of alcohol advertising
on the broadcast media. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Alcoholism and Drug
Abuse of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985)
(written testimony on file with the Notre Dame Law Review) [hereinafter cited as 1985
Hearings].
2 See Blodgett, Brew ha ha, A.B.A.J., Mar. 1985, at 36; Smith, Drive to Ban TV Beer and
Wine Ads, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1985, at Y21, col. 1; Potts, A Battle Brews Over Banning Broad-
cast Ads for Beer and Wine, Wash. Post, Dec. 24, 1984, at 21, col. 1 (National Weekly ed.);
Hemp, Advertising Ban Versus Free Speech, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, at F12, col. 4.
3 The twenty-first amendment provides in part: "The transportation or importation
into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of
intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited." U.S. CONST.
amend. XXI, § 2.
4 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 561.42(10)-(12) (West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-
714 (Supp. 1984); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 138, § 24 (Michie/Law. Co-op. 1981); Miss. CODE
ANN. §§ 67-1-85, 97-31-1 (1972 & Supp. 1984); OKLA. STAT. ANN., tit. 37, § 516 (West
Supp. 1984); UTAH CODE ANN. § 32-7-26 to -28 (1953 & Supp. 1983).
5 See notes 8-20 infra and accompanying text.
6 U.S. CONST. amend. I. Restraints on alcohol advertising also have been challenged
on equal protection grounds. See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 752-53 (5th Cir.
1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984).
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speech. Part III applies the Supreme Court's test for evaluating the
constitutionality of a restriction on commercial speech and deter-
mines that a prohibition of alcohol advertising violates the first
amendment. Finally, Part IV considers the unique characteristics of
the electronic media which traditionally have justified diminished
first amendment protection for broadcasters and maintains that
these characteristics do not support a prohibition of alcohol adver-
tising on television and radio.
I. The First Amendment and Commercial Speech
The Supreme Court has only recently afforded commercial
speech any protection under the first amendment. 7 In Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. ,8 the Court
first adopted the position that the truthful advertising of a lawful
product may not be completely suppressed.9 The opinion rested
on the Court's belief that the free flow of commercial information is
necessary for intelligent and well informed consumer decision-mak-
ing.10 The Court thus recognized the public's right to receive, as
well as the seller's right to disseminate, commercial information."
Yet the Court also emphasized the "common sense" distinctions
between commercial speech and other forms of protected speech,' 2
7 Until the mid-1970's, the Court's view was represented by Valentine v. Chrestensen,
316 U.S. 52 (1942), which held that purely commercial advertising falls outside the protec-
tion of the first amendment. The Court retreated somewhat from this position in Bigelow
v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In Bigelow, the Court rejected the argument that an adver-
tisement for abortion referral services was unprotected because it was commercial in na-
ture. The Court distinguished Chrestensen as a mere regulation of the manner in which
commercial advertising could be distributed. Id. at 818-20. Yet the Court noted that the
abortion advertisement "did more than simply propose a commercial transaction. It con-
tained factual material of clear 'public interest.' " Id. at 822. Given this "public interest"
element, the Court did not squarely address the constitutional status of purely commercial
speech.
8 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Virginia Pharmacy, the Court struck down a statute which
prohibited the advertising of prescription drug prices by pharmacists. Id. at 750 n.2.
9 Id. at 773.
10 Id. at 765. In fact, the Court pointed out that the "consumer's interest in the free
flow of commercial information. . . may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in
the day's most urgent political debate." Id. at 763.
11 Id. at 756-57. A consumer group therefore had standing to challenge the restriction.
Id.
12 Id. at 771 n.24. The Court reasoned that governmental regulation is less likely to
chill commercial speech since "advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits." Id.
Moreover, because an advertiser may easily ascertain the truth about the information which
he disseminates, there is less reason to tolerate misleading commercial speech than political
or other protected speech. Id.
Legal commentators differ greatly in their views regarding the appropriate constitu-
tional protection for commercial speech. See, e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the
Theory of Freedom, 62 IowA L. REV. 1 (1976) (first amendment theory requires a complete
denial of first amendment protection for commercial speech); Farber, Commercial Speech and
First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372 (1979) (regulations aimed directly at restrict-
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indicating that commercial speech merits only qualified first amend-
ment protection.
The Court refined its commercial speech doctrine in Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,' 3
involving the New York Public Service Commission's prohibition of
all utility advertising which promoted the use of electricity. 14 In
striking down the ban, the Court set forth a formal four part test 15
for determining the constitutionality of governmental regulation of
commercial speech: (1) In order to constitute protected commer-
cial speech, the advertising must concern a lawful activity and must
not be misleading; 16 if the advertising satisfies the first prong, it
may be regulated only if (2) the state asserts a substantial interest,' 7
(3) the regulation directly advances the asserted state interest, 18
and (4) the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve
ing the flow of commercial information should be subject to traditional first amendment
tests); Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free
Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 429 (1971) (commercial speech has an important infor-
mational function and should receive first amendment protection); Comment, First Amend-
ment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44 U. CHI. L. REv.
205 (1976) (the distinctions between commercial and noncommercial speech are valid).
13 447 U.S. 557 (1980). Before Central Hudson, the Court had struck down several re-
strictions on commercial speech based upon its decision in Virginia Pharmacy. See, e.g., Bates
v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (attorney advertising); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l,
431 U.S. 678 (1977) (contraceptive advertising); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Wil-
lingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (real estate "For Sale" signs). In fact, the only restraints on
commercial speech which the Court had upheld involved misleading or overreaching com-
mercial activity. See Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (use of trade names by optome-
trists); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (in-person client solicitation by
attorney).
14 447 U.S. at 559. The Commission believed that an advertising ban would dampen
unnecessary growth in energy consumption, a goal in accord with the national policy of
conservation of energy. Id. at 559-60.
15 The Court stated the test as follows:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least
must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the as-
serted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive an-
swers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.
Id. at 566.
16 Id. The Court reasoned that, because commercial speech protection is based upon
the informational value of advertising, commercial messages which misinform or inform
about illegal activity may be completely suppressed. Id. at 563-64.
In In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), the Court later set forth the general standards for
regulation of misleading advertising. While advertising which is "actually" or "inherently"
misleading may be completely prohibited, advertising which is merely "potentially" mis-
leading must be regulated in the least intrusive way possible. Id. at 203. Thus, if the sub-
ject matter is capable of being presented in a nonmisleading manner, a complete ban is
impermissible.
17 447 U.S. at 566.
18 Id. The Court explained that "ineffective" or "remote" support is insufficient. Id. at
564.
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the state interest.' 9 The Court explained that compliance with the
third and fourth criteria is necessary to assure that the limitation on
expression will be in proportion to the state goal and will be
"designed carefully" to achieve that goal.20
The Court seemingly diluted the Central Hudson test in a subse-
quent commercial speech case, Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego,2'
by giving little effect to the third and fourth prongs. In a plurality
opinion written by Justice White, the Court struck down an ordi-
nance which prohibited most commercial and noncommercial bill-
board advertising, but only because of the ordinance's effect on
noncommercial speech. 22 The Court considered the commercial
speech aspects of the case in dicta, and concluded that the ban sat-
isfied the Central Hudson test.23 After finding that the advertising
was lawful and not misleading, the Court readily conceded that the
municipality's goals of traffic safety and city aesthetics were sub-
stantial and that the ordinance was no broader than necessary. 24 In
addressing the "more serious question" of direct advancement of
the governmental interest in traffic safety, the Court acknowledged
the "meager record," but stated: "We .. . hesitate to disagree
with the accumulated, common-sense judgments of local lawmakers
and of the many reviewing courts that billboards are real and sub-
stantial hazards to traffic safety. There is nothing here to suggest
19 Id. at 566.
20 Id. at 564. Applying its four part test, the Court first determined that utility advertis-
ing was protected commercial speech. Id. at 566-68. It rejected the argument that the first
amendment does not protect a monopolist's speech, noting that since an electric utility
faces competition from alternative energy sources, even advertising by a monopoly contains
valuable consumer information. Next, the Court found that the state's asserted interest,
conservation of energy, was substantial. Id. at 568. Without empirical evidence, the Court
also concluded that there is an "immediate connection" between advertising and demand
for electricity. The Court inferred this connection from the fact that Central Hudson chose
to contest the advertising ban. Id. at 569. With respect to the fourth part of the test, how-
ever, the Court held that the ban was more extensive than necessary to further energy
conservation, because it prohibited promotional advertising regardless of the impact of the
service or product in question on overall energy use. The Court also noted that the state's
interest could have been achieved by requiring that the advertisements include information
about the efficiency and expense of the offered service or product. Id. at 569-71. The
Court therefore held the ban unconstitutional. Id. at 571.
21 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion).
22 Id. at 512-17. The ordinance prohibited all billboards except for on-site commercial
advertising and 12 specified categories of signs. Id. at 493-95 & nn.1, 3. The Court struck
down the ordinance because it distinguished between noncommercial signs on the basis of
content, and because the ordinance treated commercial speech more favorably than non-
commercial speech. Id. at 513-15.
23 Id. at 507-12. Justice Stevens joined the commercial speech analysis of the plurality.
Id. at 541.
24 Id. at 507-08. With respect to the extensiveness of the ordinance, Justice White
stated: "If the city has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and
are unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach to
solving the problems they create is to prohibit them." Id. at 508.
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that these judgments are unreasonable." 25 In effect, this waiver of
proof reduced Central Hudson's commercial speech test to a rational
basis standard of review.
Though Metromedia seems to suggest that a mere reasonable
relation between the state interest and the commercial speech re-
striction will support even an extensive ban, it is significant that the
San Diego ban was directed only at the form of the advertising, not
its content. Metromedia did not necessarily alter Central Hudson's in-
termediate standard of review for content based regulations
designed to suppress information about a particular product.26
Moreover, in its most recent commercial speech cases, the Court
has been quite willing "to disagree with the accumulated, common-
sense" legislative judgment when examining a regulation under the
third and fourth criteria of Central Hudson.27 In fact, few commercial
speech bans have survived Supreme Court scrutiny since Virginia
Pharmacy.28 Though the Court's commercial speech doctrine has
not yet fully evolved,29 these results indicate that the government
25 Id. at 508-09. The Court likewise concluded that the regulation advanced the city's
aesthetic interests. Id. at 510.
26 Accord Comment, Standard of Review for Regulations of Commercial Speech: Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 66 MINN. L. REv. 903, 914-17 (1982); Comment, Tension Between
the First and Twenty-first Amendments in State Regulation of Alcohol Advertising, 37 VAND. L. REV.
1421, 1439-43 (1984). Under well-established first amendment analysis, a government reg-
ulation aimed at the content of the communication itself, as opposed to a regulation which
is content neutral, is presumptively unconstitutional unless the expression falls within sev-
eral unprotected categories of speech. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrrrTIoNAL LAW §§ 12-
2, -8 (1978). Arguably, a similar distinction may be made in the commercial speech area.
Thus, while a content neutral advertising regulation need only satisfy a rational basis test, a
restriction directed at a particular product still should be subject to Central Hudson's inter-
mediate level of review.
27 In In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191 (1982), the Court held that the attorney advertising in
question was not inherently or actually misleading. Id. at 206-07. Because the state failed
to assert that the advertising restrictions at issue advanced a substantial interest, or were no
more extensive than necessary, the Court held the attorney advertising restrictions uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 205-07.
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875 (1983), the Court once again
held a commercial speech ban unconstitutional under Central Hudson. Bolger involved a fed-
eral statute which prohibited the unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements. Id. at
2877-78. Though the Court conceded that the government had a substantial interest in
assisting parents' efforts to control the manner in which their children learn about birth
control, it found that the statute provided "only the most limited incremental support for
the interest asserted." Id. at 2883-84. According to the Court, parents can screen mail and
"must already cope with the multitude of external stimuli that color their children's percep-
tion of sensitive subjects." Id. at 2884. The ban also was declared more extensive than
necessary because it reduced the adult population to reading "that which would be suitable
for a sandbox." Id.
28 See notes 13, 27 supra.
29 The Court will consider two additional commercial speech cases in 1985. See SEC v.
Lowe, 725 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 81 (Oct. 1, 1984) (No. 83-1911)
(an investment adviser was barred from publishing his newsletters after the SEC revoked
his registration); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Zauderer, 10 Ohio St. 3d 44, 461 N.E.2d
883 (1984), prob. juris. noted, 105 S. Ct. 76 (Oct. 1, 1984) (No. 83-2166) (Ohio Disciplinary
19851
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faces a heavy burden when attempting to restrict the truthful adver-
tising of a lawful product. 30
II. Challenges to State Restrictions on Alcoholic Beverage
Advertising
A. Recent Cases
The Supreme Court has yet to fully examine restrictions on al-
coholic beverage advertising under the Central Hudson test. How-
ever, three lower courts which have considered the issue have
sustained state regulations against first amendment attack.31 In
Queensgate Investment Co. v. Liquor Control Commission,32 the Ohio
Supreme Court upheld an Ohio statute which restricted the ability
of certain liquor permit holders to advertise alcohol prices on their
licensed premises.3 3 These permit holders were still permitted to
advertise through other means, and manufacturers and distributors
of alcohol were not affected by the regulation. Though the Ohio
Supreme Court purported to apply the Central Hudson test, it char-
acterized the statute as a regulation of the alcoholic beverages
themselves, thereby minimizing the first amendment implications
Rules prohibited an attorney from advertising his availability for representation of women
injured through use of the Dalkon Shield).
30 The burden ofjustifying a restraint on commercial speech falls on the party seeking
to uphold the restraint. Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2882 n.20
(1983).
31 See Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied,
104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984); Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp, 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694
(1984); Queensgate Inv. Co. v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N.E.2d
138 (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 807 (1982). Several state courts have invalidated
liquor advertising regulations under the first amendment. See Brooks v. State, 442 A.2d 93
(Del. Super. Ct. 1981); Heir v. Degnan, 82 N.J. 109, 411 A.2d 194 (1980).
32 69 Ohio St. 2d 361, 433 N.E.2d 138 (per curiam), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 807
(1982).
33 The Ohio statute provided in part:
No alcoholic beverages shall be advertised in Ohio except in the manner set
forth in 4301:1-1-03 and as hereinafter provided.
(A) As to advertising on the premises, holders of Class C, D, and G permits
shall not advertise the price per bottle or drink of any alcoholic beverage, or in any
manner refer to price or price advantage except within their premises and in a
manner not visible from the outside of said premises.
(B) Manufacturers and distributors of alcoholic beverages are permitted to
advertise their products in Ohio.
Holders of Class C, D, and G permits shall be authorized to advertise in news-
papers of general circulation, radio and television, on bill boards, calendars, in or
on public conveyances and in regularly published magazines. Advertising may in-
clude the retail price of the original container or packages, but such advertising
may not in any manner refer to price advantage.
Onio ADMIN. CODE § 4301:1-1-44 (1984) (amended Sept. 1984), quoted in 69 Ohio St. 2d at
361 n.1, 433 N.E.2d at 139 n.1.
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of the statute.34 The United States Supreme Court later summarily
dismissed the appeal for lack of a substantial federal question,
which constituted an affirmance of the judgment below.3 5
Thereafter, in Oklahoma Telecasters Association v. Crisp,3 6 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit viewed Queens-
gate's summary dismissal as binding37 when it examined two
Oklahoma laws which prohibited virtually all liquor advertising
originating from within the state.38 Although the court ultimately
proceeded to examine the merits of the plaintiffs' challenges, 39 it
determined that Queensgate "cautioned" against finding the
Oklahoma prohibition unconstitutional. 40
Addressing the merits of the case, the court emphasized that,
in light of state power to control liquor traffic under the twenty-first
amendment,41 the Oklahoma advertising laws were entitled to a
34 69 Ohio St. 2d at 366, 433 N.E.2d at 142.
35 459 U.S. 807 (1982); see Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam) (a
summary dismissal is binding in cases where substantially similar issues are presented);
Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975) (a summary dismissal of an appeal for lack of a
substantial federal question is a decision on the merits). See also notes 54-58 infra and ac-
companying text.
36 699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983), rev'd on othergrounds sub nom. Capital Cities Cable, Inc.
v. Crisp, 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984). On certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Oklahoma
regulations were preempted by FCC rules which required cable operators to carry signals in
full. 104 S. Ct. at 2709. The Court therefore struck down the restrictions without reaching
the first amendment issue.
37 In determining the precedential weight of Queensgate, the court followed the rule set
forth in Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975). See note 35 supra. Emphasizing the similari-
ties between the Ohio and Oklahoma regulations, the court stated:
The crucial similarity between the cases. . . is this: in both cases, the state, acting
under its powers granted by the Twenty-first Amendment, has chosen to prohibit
some, but not all, forms of liquor advertising with the goal of decreasing the con-
sumption and abuse of alcoholic beverages. We are confident that the constitu-
tional question presented in Queezisgate and in the present appeals is substantially
the same.
699 F.2d at 497. At the same time, the court recognized that the Oklahoma laws were
"indeed broader" than the regulation in Queensgate. Id.
38 In Crisp, a group of broadcasters and cable operators challenged provisions of the
Oklahoma Constitution and Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control Act which completely
prohibited the advertising of alcoholic beverages except by strictly regulated on-premise
signs. 699 F.2d at 492. The Oklahoma Constitution provided: "It shall be unlawful for any
person, firm or corporation to advertise the sale of alcoholic beverage within the State of
Oklahoma, except one sign at the retail outlet bearing the words 'Retail Alcoholic Liquor
Store.'" OKLA. CONsT. art. XXVII, § 5 (repealed 1984). See also OYLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37,
§ 516 (West Supp. 1984) (only on-premise signs are permitted). However, because the
definition of "beer" included only beverages containing more than 3.2%o alcohol, the ad-
vertising of all beer was generally allowed. 699 F.2d at 492. In addition, advertising in out-
of-state printed publications distributed within the state was permitted. Id. at 502.
39 The court noted the Supreme Court's admonition that courts should not become so
preoccupied with the effect of a summary dismissal that they fail to address the merits of the
case. 699 F.2d at 497 (quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 177 (1977)).
40 Id.
41 See note 3 supra.
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presumption of validity. 42 The court perceived this power as "per-
mitting regulation of commercial speech that might not otherwise
be permissible." 43 Proceeding with a Central Hudson analysis, the
court found that the restrictions easily passed the first two criteria
of the test.44 Regarding the third and fourth prongs, the court re-
lied on the rational basis approach of the Metromedia plurality, 45 as
well as the deference to the legislature it believed the twenty-first
amendment dictated. 46 Thus, though the record failed to establish
that the Oklahoma laws had any direct effect on alcohol consump-
tion, the court concluded that the restrictions were "reasonably re-
lated" to the state's interest in promoting temperance. 47 The court
also determined that the prohibition was no more extensive than
necessary, noting that the ordinance in Metromedia had banned vir-
tually all billboards but had nevertheless satisfied the fourth prong
under Central Hudson.48 The court therefore upheld the advertising
ban, utilizing Queensgate, Metromedia and the twenty-first amendment
to alter the Central Hudson test.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
also upheld a similar liquor advertising ban, using a comparable
formulation of the Central Hudson test. In Dunagin v. City of Oxford,
42 699 F.2d at 498 (quoting New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718
(1981) (per curiam)).
43 Id. at 502.
44 Id. at 500. The court rejected the argument that alcohol advertising is misleading
because it associates drinking with only positive images and fails to disclose the dangers of
the product, because the same might be said of almost all advertising. Id. at 500 n.9. The
second prong was easily met; the court found that controlling alcohol abuse, which affects
highway safety and family stability, is undoubtedly a substantial state interest. Id. at 500.
45 Referring to Metromedia, the court stated:
In that case, the ppellants argued that there was nothing in the record to show
any connection between billboards, which San Diego had essentially prohibited,
and traffic safety, one of the asserted governmental interests. The California
Supreme Court had held, nevertheless, that as a matter of law the ordinance elimi-
nating billboards was reasonably related to traffic safety. The plurality agreed with
that holding.
Id. at 501 (citations omitted).
46 Id. The court was particularly influenced by New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bel-
lanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam), in which the Supreme Court permitted the state to
regulate nude dancing in licensed liquor establishments pursuant to its powers under the
twenty-first amendment. But see note 70 infra.
47 699 F.2d at 501. The court stated that, because the entire economy of the broadcast
and cable industries is based on the belief that advertising increases sales, it was not "con-
stitutionally unreasonable" for the state of Oklahoma to believe that advertising not only
affects market share but also increases alcohol consumption generally. Id. Both the broad-
cast and alcohol industries disagree with this view of the effects of advertising. See note 75
infra and accompanying text.
48 699 F.2d at 501. The court also observed that the statute did not completely pro-
hibit advertising in the state; advertising in publications printed out-of-state but distributed
within the state was permitted, and the rebroadcasting of beer commercials was not prohib-
ited. Id. at 502.
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Mississippi, 4 9 the Fifth Circuit, like the Tenth Circuit, decided that
while Queensgate "cautioned" against invalidating Mississippi's regu-
lation, it should nevertheless examine the merits of the case under
the Central Hudson test.50 Concentrating on the Metromedia Court's
reluctance to disagree with the common-sense judgments of local
lawmakers and noting that the regulation of liquor is a matter of
"peculiar importance" to the state in light of the twenty-first
amendment,5' the court found that there was "sufficient reason" to
believe that advertising and alcohol consumption are linked,
whether or not there was scientific proof. 52 Addressing the exten-
siveness of Mississippi's ban, the court relied on the Metromedia
Court's conclusion that the only effective way of solving the
problems posed by billboards is simply to prohibit them. Similarly,
the Dunagin court reasoned that the only effective means of elimi-
nating the problems of liquor advertising is to ban the
advertising.53
49 718 F.2d 738 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984). Dunagin
was a consolidated rehearing of the appeals in Lamar Outdoor Advertising, Inc. v. Missis-
sippi State Tax Comm'n, 701 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1983) and Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 701
F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1983). The court in Lamar had struck down Mississippi's ban on liquor
advertising under the Central Hudson test. 701 F.2d at 331-33. In light of the Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision in Crisp, however, the Fifth Circuit voted to rehear the appeals en banc. 718
F.2d at 740 n.2.
The Mississippi regulation at issue prohibited virtually all liquor advertisements
originating from within the state. The regulation provided in part:
No person, firm or corporation shall originate advertisement in this State, dealing
with alcoholic beverages by any means whatsoever, including but not limited to
newspapers, radio, television, circular, dodger, word of mouth, signs, billboards,
displays or any other advertising media, except as follows:
(1) On the front of any licensed retail package store building, and no higher
than the top of the roof of the permitted place of business at its highest point,
there may be printed without illumination, in letters not more than eight (8) inches
high, the name of the business, the permit number thereof, which may be pre-
ceded by the words "A.B.C. Permit No. -," and the words "Package Liquor Sold
Here." Where the package retail store is located in a building of more than one
story in height, the top of such sign shall not be higher than the top of the first
story.
Id. at 740 n.3 (quoting Regulation No. 6, promulgated by Mississippi State Tax Comm'n
pursuant to Miss. CODE ANN. § 67-1-37(e) (Supp. 1983)). In addition to on-premise signs,
beer advertising and advertisements originating out-of-state, including those in television,
radio, and print, were permitted, however. Id. at 741. The plaintiffs also challenged a stat-
ute which prohibited most forms of sign advertising, Miss. ANN. CODE § 67-1-85 (1972)
(amended 1982).
50 718 F.2d at 746.
51 Id. at 750.
52 Id. The court also relied upon the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Central
Hudson, where the Court found an "immediate connection" between advertising and de-
mand for electricity. Id. at 749. See note 20 supra.
53 See note 24 supra. The Dunagin court stated:
We do not believe that a less restrictive time, place and manner restriction,
such as a disclaimer warning of the dangers of alcohol, would be effective. The
state's concern is not that the public is unaware of the dangers of alcohol. ...
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B. Analysis of Crisp and Dunagin
The Fifth and Tenth Circuits employed similar reasoning in
upholding extensive advertising bans. The Crisp and Dunagin deci-
sions, however, are flawed for several reasons. First, both courts,
the Crisp court in particular, gave undue weight to the Supreme
Court's summary dismissal of Queensgate. Though a summary dis-
missal of an appeal for lack of a substantial federal question consti-
tutes a decision on the merits, 54 it is binding on lower courts only
with respect to the precise constitutional issues necessarily de-
cided.55 Other courts are not bound by the affirmed court's reason-
ing.56 Under commercial speech analysis, a minimal restraint on
advertising does not raise the same first amendment concerns as a
complete ban. Because the statute in Queensgate restricted only a
very limited form of advertising and applied only to licensees of a
state agency, 57 Queensgate should not be viewed as binding in cases
involving far more extensive bans such as those adopted in
Oklahoma and Mississippi.
5 8
Second, both courts attributed unwarranted emphasis to the
deferential approach used in Metromedia. In Metromedia, the prob-
lem facing the City of San Diego was theform of certain commercial
advertisements, not the content of the message conveyed. In con-
trast, alcohol advertising restrictions are aimed at the actual content
of the communication. Though the Metromedia plurality did not re-
quire evidence that billboards in fact affect traffic safety, a waiver of
proof may be inappropriate for a content based regulation5 9 In
addition, because the billboards, as structures, interfered with San
Diego's interests, removal of the billboards was probably the only
solution. Unlike the potential hazards created by billboards, the
dangers posed by alcohol advertisements may be alleviated without
complete prohibition. Where the actual content of the advertising
presents a hazard, the Supreme Court has consistently preferred
The concern instead is that advertising will unduly promote alcohol consumption
despite known dangers.
718 F.2d at 751.
54 See Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (per curiam); Hicks v. Miranda, 422
U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
55 Mandel, 432 U.S. at 176.
56 Id.
57 See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
58 Accord Comment, The Substantive Fallacy of the Twenty-First Amendment: A Critique of
Oklahoma Telecasters Association v. Crisp, 61 DEN. LJ. 235 (1983).
59 See note 26 supra and accompanying text. The application of Central Hudson's inter-
mediate standard of review, as opposed to Metromedia's rational basis standard, most signifi-
cantly affects the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test because, even in Central Hudson, the
Court did not require empirical evidence to prove direct advancement of the state interest.
See note 20 supra. For a discussion of the use of empirical evidence under the third prong of
Central Hudson, see notes 78-82 infra and accompanying text.
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remedies which increase the flow of information rather than those
which diminish it and thereby keep the public in ignorance.60 Thus,
to the extent that the Fifth and Tenth Circuits utilized Metromedia to
analyze the means employed by Mississippi and Oklahoma to re-
duce alcohol abuse, their conclusions are questionable.
Finally, both courts improperly incorporated the twenty-first
amendment into the Central Hudson test.6 1 The history of the
amendment indicates that it was designed to create an exception to
the normal operation of the commerce clause, permitting states to
impose burdens on interstate commerce which otherwise would be
invalid. 62 As one commentator notes, however, the twenty-first
amendment does not license the states to override other constitu-
tional provisions: "Neither the text nor the history of the Twenty-
first amendment suggests that it qualifies individual rights pro-
tected by the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment where
the sale or use of liquor is concerned." 63 In practice, the Supreme
Court consistently has endorsed this principle in cases involving in-
terplay between the twenty-first amendment and the equal protec-
tion clause,64 the establishment clause, 65 and the due process
clause. 66
The Court recently examined the relationship between liquor
advertising and the twenty-first amendment in Capital Cities Cable,
Inc. v. Crisp,67 in which it considered the Oklahoma advertising laws
upheld by the Tenth Circuit in Crisp. Though the Court did not
60 See Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
61 The twenty-first amendment, which repealed prohibition, recognizes the states' right
to continue to regulate the transportation or importation of intoxicating liquors within their
borders. See note 3 supra. Twenty-first amendment power has not been limited by a literal
reading of the amendment. In addition to deciding whether to permit the importation or
sale of alcohol within its borders, a state may choose how to structure its entire liquor
distribution system. California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445
U.S. 97, 110 (1980).
62 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 205-06 (1976). The twenty-first amendment, how-
ever, does not completely exempt states from the federal commerce power whenever alco-
holic beverages are the subject of regulation. See, e.g., California Retail Liquor Dealers
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (price-setting by wine producers); Hos-
tetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324 (1964) (sale of liquor to consum-
ers in foreign countries where the sales are supervised by the Federal Bureau of Customs).
63 P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTnONAL DECISION-MAKING 258 (1975), quoted in
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 206 (1976).
64 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 204-09 (1976) (statute which prohibited the sale of
beer to men under twenty-one and women under eighteen violated equal protection).
65 See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 122 n.5 (1982) (the twenty-first
amendment may not impinge upon the establishment clause by permitting a church to veto
the issuance of a liquor license to businesses within a radius of five hundred feet).
66 See Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436 (1971) (a statute which permitted
the posting of names of excessive drinkers in retail liquor outlets violated due process).
67 104 S. Ct. 2694 (1984), rev'g on other grounds Oklahoma Telecasters Ass'n v. Crisp,
699 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1983).
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reach the commercial speech issue, invalidating Oklahoma's adver-
tising prohibitions on federal preemption grounds instead,68 its
analysis of the twenty-first amendment is instructive:
In contrast to state regulations governing the conditions under
which liquor may be imported or sold within the state, . . . the
application of Oklahoma's advertising ban to the importation of
distant signals by cable television operators engages only indi-
rectly the central power reserved by § 2 of the Twenty-first
Amendment-that of exercising "control over whether to per-
mit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor
distribution system."'69
Given this precedent, as well as the Court's refusal to permit the
twenty-first amendment to diminish individual rights, it seems un-
likely that the Court would permit a state, through an "indirect"
exercise of the twenty-first amendment, to infringe upon otherwise
protected first amendment rights.
70
In relying on the twenty-first amendment, the Crisp and
Dunagin courts apparently presumed that a state's power to com-
pletely prohibit the sale and consumption of alcohol includes the
lesser power to indirectly regulate consumption through the sup-
pression of advertising. Yet the courts failed to follow the estab-
lished principle that the twenty-first amendment does not permit
the states to abridge individual rights. Once a state has chosen to
permit the sale and consumption of alcohol within its borders, it
68 The Oklahoma regulations were preempted by FCC rules requiring cable operators
to carry signals in full. 104 S. Ct. at 2703-04, 2709.
69 Id. at 2709.
70 Only two Supreme Court cases even arguably support the contrary position of the
Fifth and Tenth Circuits. In California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972), the Court upheld a
regulation which prohibited explicit sexual entertainment in licensed liquor establishments.
The Court viewed the regulation primarily as a restriction on the sale of liquor under the
twenty-first amendment, though it admitted that some forms of the incidentally suppressed
expression were ordinarily protected by the first amendment. Id. at 118. In New York State
Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714 (1981) (per curiam), the Court similarly upheld a
New York statute which prohibited nude dancing on the premises of liquor license holders.
Id. at 717-18. Neither case, however, holds that regulations enacted pursuant to the twenty-
first amendment may abridge otherwise constitutionally protected speech. Instead, LaRue
and Bellanca simply establish a state's power to regulate the conditions under which liquor is
sold. The entertainment involved was only incidentally burdened, and was prohibited only
in establishments licensed to sell liquor. Moreover, the expression consisted of conduct
with only minimal communicative aspects. In fact, the Court characterized the entertain-
ment in LaRue as consisting "more of gross sexuality than of communication." 409 U.S. at
118. In contrast, a restriction on advertising is not incidental to communication but is a
direct regulation of speech. LaRue and Bellanca therefore do not support a different appli-
cation of the Central Hudson test whenever alcoholic beverages are the subject of regulation.
For further discussion of the relationship between the first and twenty-first amend-
ments, see Note, Liquor Advertising: Resolving the Clash Between the First and Twenty-first Amend-
ments, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157 (1984); Comment, Alcoholic Beverage Advertising and the First
Amendment, 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 861 (1983); Comment, Tension Between the First and Twenty-first
Amendments in State Regulation of Alcohol Advertising, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1421 (1984).
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should not attempt to restrict such activity through the suppression
of constitutionally protected speech. Because the courts also erred
in utilizing Queensgate and Metromedia to dilute the commercial
speech standard of review, it is necessary to examine the proper
application of the Central Hudson test to restrictions on alcohol
advertising.
III. Application of Central Hudson to Restrictions on Alcoholic
Beverage Advertising
The first two prongs of the Central Hudson test71 pose little diffi-
culty. First, because alcohol advertising relates to a lawful activity
and is not inherently misleading, such advertising constitutes pro-
tected commercial speech. 72 Central Hudson's second prong is also
easily satisfied-the government undoubtedly has a substantial in-
terest in controlling alcohol abuse, which affects the safety of high-
ways, the stability of families, 73 and the health of the public.74 The
critical inquiry under commercial speech analysis, however, is
whether the advertising restriction is designed carefully to achieve
the government goal. Together the third and fourth prongs of the
71 See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
72 In some states, such as Mississippi, alcohol may be legally sold only in certain coun-
ties. The Fifth Circuit, however, dismissed the argument that liquor advertising promotes
an illegal activity in states with dry counties and is therefore unprotected commercial
speech. Dunagin v. City of Oxford, 718 F.2d 738, 742-43 (5th Cir. 1983) (en banc), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 3553 (1984).
Critics of alcohol advertising have argued that alcohol advertising is misleading in two
ways. First, advertising allegedly creates the impression that drinking is linked with sexual,
business, and social success. See Mosher & Wallack, Proposed Reforms in the Regulation ofAlco-
holic Beverage Advertising, 8 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 87, 89 (1979). It is not surprising, how-
ever, that advertisers seek to associate their products with positive images. Moreover,
alcohol advertising accurately reflects certain aspects of our society, as drinking does play a
prominent role in some business and social situations. Second, alcohol advertisements are
said to be misleading because they fail to include information about the hazards of alcohol
use. Id. at 103. But, as the Supreme Court has stated, in the case of omissions in advertis-
ing, "the preferred remedy is more disclosure, rather than less." Bates v. State Bar, 433
U.S. 350, 375 (1977); see note 16 supra. Thus, though a balance of information regarding
the product's dangers may be lacking, the solution is warnings or counter-advertising. Ab-
sent compliance with the remaining portions of the Central Hudson test, a ban which sup-
presses existing truthful information about legal activity is impermissible.
Both the Crisp and Dunagin courts rejected the contention that alcohol advertising is
misleading. In Crisp, the court noted: "[T]he qualities [which allegedly] make these com-
mercials 'inherently misleading'--the commercials tend to project an image of wine drink-
ers as successful, fun-loving people, without warning of the dangers of alcohol-are present
in the advertising of almost any product from automobiles to snack foods." 699 F.2d at 500
n.9. Similarly, the Dunagin court found that "[n]early all advertising associates the pro-
moted product with a positive or alluring lifestyle or famous or beautiful people. Our pol-
icy is to leave it to the public to cope for themselves with Madison Avenue panache and
hard sells." 718 F.2d at 743.
73 Crisp, 699 F.2d at 500.
74 Dunagin, 718 F.2d at 747 (citing expert testimony from trial).
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Central Hudson test assure the requisite relationship between the leg-
islative means and ends.
The third prong, which addresses whether advertising restric-
tions directly advance the government interest in reducing alcohol
abuse, is troublesome because of uncertainty about the effects of
alcohol advertising. Opponents of advertising restrictions maintain
that alcohol advertising merely causes existing consumers to shift
from one brand to another. 75 Proponents of such restrictions claim
that advertisers in fact target new markets, such as women and
young people, thereby bringing new consumers into the market as
well as increasing the consumption levels of existing drinkers.
7 6
Because the scientific community continues to debate the actual im-
pact of advertising upon excessive alcohol consumption,77 satisfac-
tion of the third prong depends upon whether the Court requires
conclusive empirical evidence.
While "direct advancement" should require more than a ra-
tional basis standard of review, a review of the Court's past com-
mercial speech cases suggests that empirical evidence is not always
critical. 78 In Central Hudson, for example, the Court inferred "an
75 See, e.g., 1985 Hearings, supra note I (statement of Donald Shea, President, United
States Brewers Ass'n) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review); id. (statement of Edward
Fritts, Nat'l Ass'n of Broadcasters) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review); 1976 Hearings,
supra note 1, at 345 (statement of United States Brewers Ass'n).
76 See, e.g., Katzper, Ryback & Hertzman, Alcohol Beverage Advertisement and Consumption, 8
J. DRUG ISSUES 339, 347-51 (1978); cf. Strickland & Finn, Targeting of Magazine Alcohol Bever-
age Advertisements, 14 J. DRUG ISSUES 449, 465 (1984) (an analysis of targeted advertisements
does not necessarily reveal the actual causal effects of such advertising on the targeted
subgroups).
77 See Strickland, Content and Effects ofAlcohol Advertising: Comment on NTIS Pub. No. PB82-
123142, 45 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 87 (1984) (the author critiques the methodology employed in
a recent study on the effects of alcohol advertising); Atkin & Block, A Reply to Strickland, 45J.
STUD. ALCOHOL 93 (1984) (the researchers who conducted the study, which suggested that
alcohol advertising affects consumption, respond to Strickland's criticisms). Compare Atkin
& Block, Effectiveness of Celebrity Endorsers, J. ADVERTISING RESEARCH, Feb./Mar. 1983, at 57
(research showed that celebrity endorsers of alcoholic beverages significantly influence ad-
olescents) with Strickland, Alcohol Advertising: Orientations and Influence, IJ. ADVERTISING 307
(1982) (research indicated that overall televised alcohol advertising had virtually no effect
on teenagers).
Similar debate continues over the effect, if any, which Congress' 1969 cigarette adver-
tising ban has had on cigarette consumption, with little consensus among the experts. See
Mosher & Wallack, supra note 72, at 93.
78 The Court sometimes evaluates the relationship between the commercial speech reg-
ulation and the government interest on the basis of intuition rather than reliance on statisti-
cal data. See, e.g., Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2884 (1983) (a
statute prohibiting the unsolicited mailing of contraceptive advertisements did not directly
aid parents in controlling their children's access to birth control information, because par-
ents presumably can screen mail); Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980) (there is an "immediate connection" between advertis-
ing and energy consumption); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977) (restraints on
attorney advertising are an ineffective way of deterring unprofessional work); Carey v. Pop-
ulation Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977) (the contraceptive advertisements in question
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immediate connection" between advertising and demand for elec-
tricity from the fact that Central Hudson chose to contest the ban.79
Although Central Hudson arguably supports finding a similar connec-
tion between advertising and alcohol consumption, the two situa-
tions are not completely analogous. Alcohol use is affected by a
complex interaction of factors such as cultural, family and peer
group influences.8 0 Advertising therefore may play only a minimal
role in excessive alcohol consumption, making an "immediate con-
nection" less obvious. Moreover, the contention that advertising
increases only market share may be raised more convincingly by the
alcohol industry than by a utility monopoly.8 1 In order to avoid
speculation, alcohol advertising should not be regulated without at
least some empirical basis.82 Yet, because the precise role which
advertising plays in behavior as complex as alcohol abuse is not ca-
pable of being proven with absolute certainty, the Court is not
likely to question sound empirical research which links advertising
to alcohol consumption simply because scientists have been unable
to reach a complete consensus. Thus, as long as the government is
did not incite illicit sexual activity among the young); cf. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1,
13-15 (1979) (the state legislature's concerns about deceptive uses of optometrist trade
names were not speculative, but were based on the state's actual experience with such prac-
tices); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 464 (1978) (the abuses inherent in
face-to-face selling were well documented); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 95-96 (1977) (a prohibition on realty "For Sale" signs was struck down, partly
because the record failed to show that the prohibition controlled panic selling by reducing
public awareness of realty sales).
In other areas of law, the Court has similarly relied on an intuitive approach when
empirical evidence has been inconclusive or even nonexistent. See, e.g., New York State
Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 718 (1981) (per curiam) (common sense dictates
that topless dancing coupled with alcohol in a public place inspires undesirable behavior);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 184-86 (1976) (regardless of inconclusive empirical data,
the death penalty "undoubtedly" is a significant deterrent); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 58 (1973) (there is at least an arguable correlation between obscene material
and crime).
79 447 U.S. at 569; see note 20 supra.
80 See, e.g., Jessor &Jessor, Adolescent Development and the Onset of Drinking: A Longitudinal
Study, 36J. STUD. ALCOHOL 27 (1975); Margulies, Kessler & Kandel, A Longitudinal Study of
Onset of Drinking Among High-School Students, 38 J. STUD. ALCOHOL 897 (1977).
81 The Central Hudson Court acknowledged that even a utility monopoly competes with
alternative energy sources. 447 U.S. at 567. The Court, however, made this observation
only to establish that utility advertising has informational value for consumers considering
other energy sources. The Public Service Commission had argued that advertising by a
monopoly is not important for consumer decision-making, precluding any first amendment
protection. Id. at 566-68. Though the existence of alternative energy sources may make
utility advertising valuable from the consumer's standpoint, it does not necessarily follow
that the monopolist's primary reason for advertising is merely to compete with the other
energy sources for its share of a fixed market.
82 Cf. Note, Liquor Advertising: Resolving the Clash Between the First and Twenty-first Amend-
ments, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 157, 182-83 (1984) (as in Central Hudson, the connection between
alcohol advertising and excessive consumption may be inferred from the fact that advertis-
ers have chosen to contest advertising bans).
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able to produce such evidence, the Court would probably find that
the third prong of the Central Hudson test is satisfied despite contin-
uing scientific debate.
Nevertheless, even if a ban on advertising would directly serve
the asserted government interest, under the fourth prong "[t]he
State cannot regulate speech that poses no danger to the asserted
state interest. . . nor can it completely suppress information when
narrower restrictions on expression would serve its interest as
well." 83 In Central Hudson, the Court suggested that the state could
have promoted conservation by supplementing advertising with in-
formation about energy efficiency, rather than prohibiting all adver-
tising.8 4 Viable alternatives to a complete ban also exist in the area
of alcohol advertising. For instance, alcohol advertising could be
countered by messages which inform the public of the hazards asso-
ciated with alcohol abuse.8 5 Furthermore, regulations could re-
strict only alcohol advertising which promotes underage or
excessive drinking, or which associates drinking with driving.
86
Because less extensive alternatives exist, sweeping advertising
prohibitions such as those adopted in Oklahoma and Mississippi
fail to pass constitutional muster under the Central Hudson test. The
question remains, however, whether the Central Hudson test applies
with equal force to all types of media, including radio and
television.
IV. The First Amendment and Broadcasting Advertising
The broadcast media traditionally have received special treat-
ment under the first amendment. 87 The Court has not yet fully ex-
amined the status of the broadcast media in the commercial speech
context. Nevertheless, when it first brought commercial speech
within the protection of the first amendment in Virginia Pharmacy,
the Court cautioned that "the special problems of the electronic
83 Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565.
84 Id. at 570-71; see note 20 supra.
85 Any regulation of alcohol advertising, including less intrusive versions, must comply
with the Central Hudson test, requiring that an immediate connection between the advertis-
ing and alcohol consumption be established. Once such a connection is demonstrated,
however, past experience with counter-advertising suggests that this alternative to a com-
plete ban would be an effective way of educating the public in order to reduce alcohol
abuse. See note 106 infra and accompanying text.
86 See 1976 Hearings, supra note 1, at 204-06 (examples of ads which are geared to the
youth market, invite excessive drinking, or suggest drinking as a coping mechanism). To
the alcohol industry's credit, substantial self-regulation already encourages responsible ad-
vertising. See id. at 214-15 (self-imposed code for distilled spirits industry); id. at 348-61
(guidelines for beer advertising).
87 See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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broadcast media are . . .not in this case." 88 Moreover, in subse-
quent commercial speech cases, the Court has noted that advertis-
ing on the broadcast media "will warrant special consideration."8 9
These comments suggest that broadcast advertising enjoys a differ-
ent degree of protection. Determining the appropriate constitu-
tional standard for this variety of commercial speech is especially
important in light of the current movement to ban alcoholic bever-
age commercials on radio and television.9° The "special problems"
of the broadcast media therefore must be identified in order to as-
sess their role, if any, in the area of alcohol advertising.9 1
One of the Court's long-standing justifications for special
treatment of the broadcast media has been the scarcity of broadcast
frequencies and public ownership of the airwaves. In Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,92 for example, the Court utilized the scarcity
88 425 U.S. at 773. The Court then referred to Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell,
333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971), aff'd mem. sub nom. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Kleindienst,
405 U.S. 1000 (1972), in which the constitutionality of the 1969 congressional ban on ciga-
rette advertising over the electronic media had been upheld. 333 F. Supp. aLt 583. The
reference to Capital Broadcasting as an example of the "special problems" of the broadcast
media seems inappropriate inasmuch as the decision, which antedated the emergence of the
Supreme Court's present commercial speech doctrine, was based in part upon the former
first amendment status of commercial speech. Id. at 584. The continuing validity of Capital
Broadcasting, and thus the cigarette advertising ban's constitutionality, is questionable in
light of the subsequent development of commercial speech protection. See NOWAK, Ro-
rUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITrrTIONAL LAw 933-34 (2d ed. 1983). See also Wuliger, The Constitu-
tional Rights of Puffery: Commercial Speech and the Cigarette Broadcast Advertising Ban, 36 FED.
COM. LJ. 1 (1984) (the cigarette advertising ban fails to conform to the Central Hudson test).
Moreover, it is doubtful that Capital Broadcasting could be sustained solely on the basis of the
unique characteristics of the broadcast media. See notes 92-108 infra and accompanying
text. The rationales traditionally used to support special treatment of broadcasters would
not ordinarily justify a complete ban on product advertising, though it is arguable that ciga-
rette advertising should receive special treatment because cigarettes, unlike other products,
cannot be consumed safely in any quantity.
89 Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). See also Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods.
Corp., 103 S. Ct. 2875, 2884 (1983); In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. 191, 201 n.13 (1982) (quoting
Bates, 433 U.S. at 384); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 712 n.6 (1977) (Pow-
ell,J., concurring) (suggesting that restrictions on the advertising of contraceptives through
the electronic media, as opposed to other media, might be permissible).
"90 See note 2 supra and accompanying text. A self-imposed code generally has pre-
vented the hard liquor industry from advertising on radio and television. See 1976 Hearings,
supra note 1, at 214-15 (self-imposed code for distilled spirits industry). As a practical mat-
ter, a broadcast ban therefore would affect only beer and wine commercials.
91 For related issues, see Krattenmaker & Powe, Televised Violence: First Amendment Princi-
ples and Social Science Theory, 64 VA. L. Rav. 1123 (1978); Shinners, Offensive Personal Product
Advertising on the Broadcast Media: Can It Be Constitutionally Censored? 34 FED. CoM. LJ. 49
(1982) (analyzes whether advertising for products such as contraceptives should receive
special treatment when broadcast over the electronic media). See also Comment, The New
Commercial Speech Doctrine and Broadcasting Advertising, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 385 (1979)
(concludes that broadcast advertising should be entitled to full commercial speech
protection).
92 395 U.S. 367 (1969). See also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106,
3116-18 (1984); FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 799-800
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rationale to uphold the fairness doctrine, which required broadcast-
ers to present fair coverage of both sides of public issues, thus as-
suring the public a diversity of views. 95 The Court reasoned that,
because only a limited number of broadcast frequencies are avail-
able for allocation, those who receive licenses must serve the public
interest by permitting the presentation of opposing viewpoints. 94
However, this justification generally has been employed to secure a
balanced presentation of views on issues of public concern in order
to increase the flow of information to the public.95 In contrast, ad-
vertising bans seek to suppress speech and diminish the flow of in-
formation. The scarcity of broadcast frequencies therefore does
not constitute a "special problem" of the electronic broadcast me-
dia which would justify a complete ban on broadcast alcohol
advertising.96
The Court cited additional justifications for granting broad-
casters only limited first amendment protection in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation.97 In Pacifica the FCC issued an order banning the radio
broadcast of an "indecent but not obscene" George Carlin mono-
logue at times when children were likely to be a part of the audi-
ence. 98  The Court upheld the otherwise constitutionally
impermissible ban 99 on two grounds. First, the Court noted that
"the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive pres-
ence in the lives of all Americans," 100 so that offensive material
broadcast over the airwaves often assaults the individual in the pri-
vacy of his own home. Because prior warnings are ineffective for
the listener who tunes in to the middle of a broadcast, it is often
(1978); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 101-02
(1973); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943).
93 395 U.S. at 394, 400-01. Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241
(1974) (a similar regulation applied to the print media violated the first amendment).
94 395 U.S. at 388-89, 400-01.
95 In FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984), the Court contrasted
earlier regulations it had upheld under the scarcity doctrine with a regulation which silenced
editorializing on matters of public interest. Id. at 3127. See also Krattenmaker & Powe, supra
note 91, at 1227-28; Shinners, supra note 91, at 87-88.
Though Red Lion upheld the fairness doctrine on the basis of the public's right to bal-
anced information, this right is not unconditional. See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973) (broadcasters are not required to accept edi-
torial advertisements from everyone willing to pay for them). Moreover, the fairness doc-
trine does not apply to standard product advertising. See note 106 infra.
96 The scarcity doctrine may completely lose its viability in years to come. The Court
suggested in FCC v. League of Women Voters, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984), that, if properly
signalled by Congress or the FCC, it may be willing to reconsider the scarcity doctrine in
light of developing cable and satellite technology. Id. at 3116 n.11.
97 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
98 Id. at 729-33.
99 Suppression of nonobscene material ordinarily raises serious constitutional
problems. Id. at 741 n.17.
100 Id. at 748.
[Vol. 60:779
impossible to avoid objectionable material. 01 In addition to this
intrusiveness rationale, the Court relied on broadcasting's unique
accessibility to children.' 0 2 Since the government has an interest in
the "well-being of its youth,"' 0 3 the Court concluded that the FCC
could regulate indecent broadcasts, at least during certain hours of
the day.'0 4
The characteristics of broadcasting which the Court focused
upon in Pacifica arguably support similar timing regulations of
broadcast alcohol advertising. Television and radio commercials
are undoubtedly a "uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
Americans," and also easily accessible to children. The broadcast
industry's powerful impact on children and adolescents has caused
concern over the influence which alcohol advertising may have in
shaping attitudes toward this frequently abused product. 0 5
Yet the monologue at issue in Pacifica can be distinguished
from product advertising in two ways. First, any adverse effects
which alcohol advertising may have on viewers generally may be
countered with messages advocating responsible use of alcohol and
disclosing the risks of excessive consumption. Hence, even a time-
of-day ban on alcohol advertising is more extensive than necessary.
In fact, past experience with cigarette advertising suggests that
counter-advertising may have more effect than a ban, because it
stimulates public debate and assures a balanced flow of informa-
tion. 0 6 Second, the Pacifica Court was unquestionably affected by
101 Id. Compare Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), which involved a man who
strolled through a courthouse while wearing a jacket which bore the slogan "Fuck the
Draft." The Court noted that observers could simply look the other direction. Id. at 21.
102 438 U.S. at 749-50.
103 Id. at 749 (quoting Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968)).
104 Id. at 750-51. The Court characterized the FCC's decision as resting entirely on a
nuisance theory. Since a nuisance may be "a right thing in the wrong place," the context in
which the Carlin material was broadcast determined the outcome. Id.
105 See, e.g., 1985 Hearings, supra note 1 (statement of Martha Baker, President, Nat'l
Council on Alcoholism) (on file with the Notre Dame Law Review); 1976 Hearings, supra note 1,
at 2 (opening statement of Sen. Hathaway); id. at 36-37 (statement of Sidney Wolfe, Direc-
tor, Public Citizen's Health Research Group); id. at 151 (statement of Nicholas Johnson,
Chairperson, Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting); Atkin & Block, Effectiveness of Celebrity
Endorsers,J. ADVERISING RESEARCH, Feb./Mar. 1983, at 57. For a general discussion of the
problems associated with children and broadcasting, see Comment, Unsafe for Little Ears?
The Regulation of Broadcast Advertising to Children, 25 UCLA L. REv. 1131 (1978).
106 Before Congress banned cigarette broadcast advertising in 1969, anti-smoking
messages were carried to counter the advertisements. Following this period, cigarette con-
sumption declined. After the commercials and counter-commercials were taken off the air,
consumption began to rise again. See Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp.
582, 587-89 (D.D.C. 1971) (Wright, J., dissenting), a fd mem. sub nom. Capital Broadcasting
Co. v. Kleindienst, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972). For a discussion of the constitutionality of the
cigarette advertising ban, see note 88 supra.
Prior to the advertising ban, the FCC had required broadcasters to provide reasonable
time for anti-smoking messages pursuant to the fairness doctrine. See Television Station
WCBS-TV, 8 F.C.C.2d 381 (1967), a.ffd sub nom. Banzhafv. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir.
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the nature of the language in Carlin's monologue. 0 7 As intrusive
as broadcast advertising may be, beer and wine commercials simply
do not offend in the way that "indecent" language does. In fact,
the Pacifica court itself emphasized the narrowness of its holding,108
indicating that the decision should be read only as an approval of
restrictions on indecent language broadcast during times when
children are likely to comprise the audience. Pacifica, therefore,
does not necessarily support even a time-of-day restraint on inof-
fensive broadcast advertising.
None of the Supreme Court's traditional justifications for spe-
cial treatment of broadcasters supports a complete ban on broad-
cast alcohol advertising. The scarcity rationale has been utilized
only to sustain regulations which promote diversity by preventing
broadcasters from monopolizing the airwaves. The intrusiveness
rationale and the Court's concerns about broadcasting's accessibil-
ity to children have been limited to a partial ban on indecent
speech. Absent any additional "special problems" of the broadcast
media which the Court has not yet specified, a ban on television and
radio alcohol advertising should be no more permissible than a ban
applied to other forms of communication.
1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 842 (1969). Under the fairness doctrine, broadcasters must
present opposing viewpoints on issues of public concern. See note 93 supra and accompany-
ing text. Following the application of the fairness doctrine to product advertising, however,
it became difficult to limit Banzhafs reasoning to cigarette commercials. See, e.g., Friends of
the Earth v. FCC, 449 F.2d 1164 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (advertisements for cars with large en-
gines raise a controversial issue of public importance). Since any product advertisement
could potentially raise a controversial issue of public concern, thereby triggering fairness
doctrine obligations, the FCC abandoned the application of the fairness doctrine to stan-
dard product advertising in 1974, though by this time cigarette commercials had already
been removed from television and radio. See The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness
Doctrine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1, 24-26 (1974)
(the Fairness Report). The constitutionality of this portion of the Fairness Report was later
affirmed in National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting v. FCC, 567 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1978). See also Simmons, Commercial Advertising and the Fair-
ness Doctrine: The New FCC Policy in Perspective, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1083 (1975); Note, Fairness
and Unfairness in Television Product Advertising, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 498 (1978). Critics of alcohol
advertising therefore no longer have a right of access to the broadcast media for counter-
advertising pursuant to the fairness doctrine. The FCC's current policy, however, does not
foreclose counter-advertising advocates from obtaining media access through legislative
change. In order to reduce the resulting financial burden which mandatory free broadcast
time imposes on the broadcast industry, Congress should consider requiring the alcohol
industry to assist with the financing of paid counter-advertising. In addition, legislation
might require the alcohol commercials themselves to contain disclosures regarding the
dangers of excessive consumption. Of course, even counter-advertising legislation fails to
satisfy the Central Hudson test if a connection between advertising and alcohol consumption
cannot be established. See notes 75-82 supra and accompanying text.
107 The Court characterized the language as "vulgar," "offensive," 438 U.S. at 747,
"verbal shock treatment," and "potentially degrading and harmful to children," id. at 757-
58 (Powell, J., concurring).
108 Id. at 750.
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V. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has recognized that society benefits from
the free flow of commercial information. Accordingly, the Court
has granted commercial speech qualified first amendment protec-
tion which precludes government suppression absent a substantial
interest which is directly served by narrow regulation. Under the
Central Hudson test, a complete alcohol advertising ban is more ex-
tensive than is necessary to reduce excessive alcohol consumption
and therefore should be found unconstitutional. Rather than pro-
moting a paternalistic approach designed to suppress information,
those concerned with alcohol abuse should seek to counter such
advertising with additional information.
Contrary to the holdings of two federal courts, the power of
the states to regulate liquor traffic under the twenty-first amend-
ment should not alter commercial speech analysis under Central
Hudson. The twenty-first amendment was designed to prevent the
normal operation of the commerce clause; it does not permit the
states to abridge otherwise protected individual rights. Thus, if a
state chooses to permit the sale and consumption of alcoholic bev-
erages within its borders, it should not indirectly attempt to manip-
ulate its residents' consumption of alcohol through the suppression
of constitutionally protected speech.
Furthermore, the special characteristics of the broadcast media
do not justify diminished commercial speech protection for alco-
holic beverage advertising on radio and television. Broadcasting's
unique impact on children and adolescents should be utilized to
educate viewers about the hazards of excessive alcohol consump-
tion, not to justify a ban on the advertising of a lawful product. As
the Supreme Court has stated, "People will perceive their own best
interests if only they are well enough informed, and . . . the best
means to that end is to open the channels of communication rather
than to close them."1 09
Karen L. Sterchi
109 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976).
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